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LAW AS MEANS TO END-THOMAS AQUINAS
THOMAS E. DAVITT, S. J.*

The importance of a man can be judged by his influence on the
thinking of other men. Periodically during the course of the centuries men have appeared who exercised this power to a commanding
degree. The presence of "great" names in all fields of human endeavor
attests to this.
These are the adventurous spirits whom men of lesser mettle choose
to follow as their leaders. They are the men of stature whom others
recognize as masters and by whom they allow their minds to be
formed and their thinking influenced. Not that these pioneers are
to be followed slavishly to the last detail and no independent thinking
done after them. That would be the death of any future progress. But
it is from these men of exceptional insight, imagination and vision
that others take their first inspiration and general direction of thought.
Such a man was Thomas Aquinas. He was a trail blazer in many
regards, one of them being especially his work on law. His was the
first systematically organized treatise on law and its philosophical
roots, and over the years it has been recognized as a masterful accomplishment. Consequently, during succeeding generations this
work has been a powerful factor in shaping the minds of countless
men on the nature and significance of law.1
By way of an overview of this article, it may be said that its purpose is to present Aquinas' philosophy of law to the average lawman,
who is not necessarily trained in this type of legal thinking. This
entails an obvious difficulty for which there is no ready solution. All
that can be done, it seems, is to set out Aquinas' thinking on this
subject and let him speak for himself.
A comprehensive treatment of law includes an inquiry into its
nature and promulgation, its end, content and source, and its sanction
and the reason why it obliges. Aquinas examines these characteristics
of law first in regard to man-made law, for man-made law is easily
observable, and second in regard to God-made law. The interrelation
between the two is then indicated. His treatise on legal philosophy
is not without grounds for observations and comments which, consequently, will be made. Finally, because the practical value of
principles can best be seen in their application to fact situations, the
* Professor of Jurisprudence, Marquette University School of Law. Author,
Elements of Law (1959).

1. On the life (1225-1274) and works of Aquinas see MAArrAn, ST. THOMAS
CHESTERTON, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1933); CHENu, INTRODUC-
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impact of Aquinas' thinking on certain contemporary legal problems
will be pointed out.
Although Aquinas wrote as a theologian and his principle work is
a "Summa of Theology," nevertheless within this framework he
addressed himself to problems that were philosophical in nature and
2
were solvable according to observable data and reasoning thereon.
On this basis rests his philosophy of law as such, even though at times
he applies it to matters known from theology.
MAN-MADE LAW
Before any of the other aspects of law can be profitably investigated, what law is in itself must be examined. Aquinas ascertains
this by examining man-made law. Law is seen to be a rule or
measure of human actions, since by it men are either induced
to act or are restrained from acting in a certain way.3 A speed law,
for instance (and to use a modern example), is such a rule. Embodied
in this rule is a means-end relationship: a certain maximum speed
limit is needed to ensure safe driving conditions. This relation of
speed to safety can be almost scientifically determined by tests conducted by traffic engineers. The basis of the means-end relationship
of law is, then, an objective fact situation and Aquinas' entire concept
of law is anchored in this relationship.
Nature
But is a law merely the words by which it is made known, or is it
something much more important that is expressed through the words?
Because words or symbols are but a medium of communicating ideas
in the mind of the speaker or writer, the words of a law are only the
expression of something of much greater significance in the minds
2. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, Q. 1, art. 3. (1267-1273).

See the English

translation, SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Benziger ed. Dominican transl. 1947). All reference to Aquinas, unless otherwise specified, will
be to this major and most readily available work. Hereinafter it will be cited
as ST.
The basic distinction between theology and philosophy should be recalled.
Theological convictions are based on the authority of divine revelation and
faith therein. Faith is an assent of the mind to a proposition, not because of
evidence, but because of the trustworthiness of the one speaking-whether
he be human or divine. Philosophical conviction, on the other hand, is based
on observable phenomena and reasoning thereon. This may be about the
order found in nature and about its cause, God. Although God is not a directly
observable datum, as far as the working of the human mind is concerned, he
is the one intelligible explanation of this phenomenon of order which is
observable.
Those who would rigorously exclude all other ways of acquiring knowledge
except the scientific method, which is indispensable in certain types of inquiry,
should critically examine the inevitable non-scientific assumptions and commitments in the scientific method itself. See especially POLANYI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE (1958); and his THE STUDY OF MAN (1959).
3. 1-2 ST 90, 1.
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of lawmakers. The words of a law communicate the directive judgment of the lawmakers (or a majority of them) that a certain means
is in some degree factually necessary for obtaining a desired endthat a speed limit of 65 miles per hour, for instance, is necessary for
safe driving conditions. Essentially, then, law is an act of lawmakers'
reason and not of their will. For it is the function of men's reason
4
and not of their will to order means to an end.
True, the will of lawmakers plays an important part in the desire
to enact a law, which in turn inspires the drafting, introduction and
passage of new laws. But the core of law is not what lawmakers
desire. It is rather the resulting directive judgment of their reason
which embodies the perceived necessity of certain means for the
common welfare. This directive judgment may be called a "command," provided law is taken-in this sense of a directive judgment of
reason,5 and not merely as an expression of the sovereign will to be
7
carried out by force. 6 This kind of' law Aquinas calls human law.
Promulgation
Promulgation of a law is necessary if the law is to have its intended
effect, the guidance of the people. They cannot be directed by a
rule of which they have no knowledge. 8 Promulgation, being the
application of the directive judgment of lawmakers to the people, 9
cannot be designated as part of the law itself. What is applied must
already be constituted before it can be applied to something else. 10
This distinction between law and its promulgation will be of capital
importance when we examine "natural law."
End
The end or purpose of law is the common good of the people. 1 The
common or public good consists principally of peace (the condition of
unity among the people brought about by order) and security (the
condition of assurance engendered by a sufficiency of the necessities
of life and of safety resulting from adequate protection of the country) .' Certain institutions which contribute to peace and security also
pertain to the common good, such as legislation and its sanctions, good
4. Ibid.
5. 1-2 ST 17, 1.

6. See AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSIrnE
LAW, 12-13 (Campbell ed. 1875).
7. 1-2 ST 91, 3; 1-2 ST 95-97.
8. 1-2 ST 90, 4.

9. Ibid.
10. 1-2

(1947).

ST 16, 1; 1-2 ST 17, 3. See also 2

LOTTIN, PRINCIPES DE MORAIE

11. 1-2 ST 90, 2; 1-2 ST 95, 4; 1-2 ST 96, 1; 1-2 ST 96, 3.
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12. AQUINAS, DE REGIMINE PRINciPIum 1, 15 (1267). See the English translation, ON KINGSHIP 63-67 (Eschmann ed. Phelan transl. 1949).
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appointments and elections, 3 and just adjudication. 14
Peace and security in turn possess their value because they are, in
the last analysis, ends related to men's last end. They are the conditions necessary for men to live responsible, knowingly decided lives
through which they can develop and perfect themselves. 15 Looked
at from this comprehensive viewpoint, the purpose of law can be
said to be to bring about right living among men, that is, to make
men good.' 6 Not that a law by itself can make men do what is right
and at the same time make them desire to do it. But it can at least
induce men to refrain from doing what is wrong because of the fear
7
they have of incurring punishment.'
The whole concept of the common good refers to that type of good
which is communicable to all the people, 18 in contradistinction to a
proper or private good, say food, which is communicable only to single
individuals. 19 As far as political life is concerned, the public good
is pre-eminent to proper or private good.20 For, it is only within the
21
matrix of the common good that the proper good is attainable.
The common good is obviously, then, not a sum total reached by
adding together the proper, say consumer, goods of individuals. It
is a good of a completely different nature. Neither is the common
good a collective good, such as would be the meal a group is about to
consume. This would have to be divided if each is to receive a share.
If the number of participants increases, the amount of food available
for each decreases. This is not the case with the common good of
peace, security and the like. These are not decreased by the number
of those who share and the number of participants does not result in
each one having less.
In this view, law is a helpful, protective guide. Its necessarily restrictive aspect is only for the purpose of accomplishing a good in
which the people can participate. The sole reason for air lane and
altitude restrictions on aircraft is that safer flying conditions may be
enjoyed by all and that all may thereby more certainly reach their
destination.
Content
The content of law for Aquinas is, in general, justice or that which
is just.22 This may be commutative or exchange justice which should
13. Ibid.

14. 2-2 ST 60, 6.
15. AQUINAS, DE REGIMINE PRINCIPIUM 1, 15 (1267).

16.
17.
18.
19.

1-2 ST
1-2 ST
1-2 ST
2-2 ST

99,
96,
28,
58,

1; 1-2 ST 92, 1.
3, 2; 1-2 ST 107, 1, 2.
4, 2.
7.

20. 2-2 ST 58, 6, 3.

21. 2-2 ST 47, 10, 2.

22. 1-2 ST 95, 3; 1-2 ST 96, 4.
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obtain between individual and individual but which has an indirect
relation to the common good, for instance, the matter of today's tort
or contract law.2 3 Or it may be contributive or legal justice which
ought to prevail between individuals as members of a community
regarding those things which are directly promotive of the common
welfare, for example, the provisions of criminal law.2 4 Or it may be
distributive justice which should exist between those who govern
and the governed concerning the administration of the common
good; for instance, benefits such as social security or burdens such as
25
taxes.
Only matters of moment, and not the inconsequential or trivial,
should be considered as fit content of a law.26 Implicit in the concept
of a just law, then, is its necessity for the common welfare and its
possibility of fulfillment by the people.27 Hence, for the content of a
law to be just it must be related to the common good, be proportioned
to the needs of the people, and be enacted by those with lawmaking
authority.2 8
A prime over-all requisite for a law from the viewpoint of Aquinas'
philosophy of law, then, is that it be just. If it is not just, if it lacks
this essential element, it is no law at all. It is rather perversity, corruption, violence and tyranny.29 To most lawmen, it may seem
unintelligible to say that an unjust law is no law. For, from the
lawyer's standpoint a statute or judicial decision is "law" until it is
respectively repealed or overruled, regardless of any other consideration as to its justness.
There are two possible explanations of the lawman's difficulty with
the proposition that "an unjust law is no law." First, his philosophy
of law may be positivistic and he may hold that "is" and "ought"
in law coincide. By the very fact that a law exists, it is just. Or,
second, while his philosophy of law may not be positivistic and may
be similar to that of Aquinas, as a lawyer he may feel that a law cannot be said to be "no law" until it is superseded by another legal rule.
If such be the case, it would profit him to advert to what is occurring
here. Two different approaches to law are resulting in two different
evaluations of law. What is taken to be a legally valid law by lawimen may be considered to be a morally bad law by philosophers.
The philosophers of law presuppose that beyond man-made law
there are other norms or rules according to which law can be evalu23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

2-2
1-2
2-2
1-2
1-2

ST 61,
ST 96,
ST 61,
ST 96,
ST 95,

1 & 2.
3; 2-2 ST 58, 5 &6.
1 &2.
2.
3.

28. 1-2 ST 96, 4.

29. 1-2 ST 92, 1, 4; 1-2 ST 93, 3, 2; 1-2 ST 95, 4; 1-2 ST 96, 4; 2-2 ST 60, 5, 1.
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ated and judged just or unjust and that these other norms should be
brought to bear on the question of a "just" law. For in this view
the "is" is not necessarily identical with what "ought to be" in law. 30
This will be discussed later under Obligation.
The determination of what the content of law will be is law in the
making. This determination involves the stages of deliberation, evaluation and decision. It has to do with ascertaining what means will
contribute most to the common welfare. For instance, there may be
a question of determining the best means of preventing smog from
enveloping a city, again to use a modern example. Various techniques
and devices for controlling fumes from automobile exhausts and industrial stacks will have to be examined and evaluated. Finally, a
decision will have to be made and a directive issued to the people.
This directive judgment, as we saw above, is the law. The process of
deliberation, evaluation and decision which led to it is prudence. 31
Hence, the directive judgment which is law is an act of political prudence. 32
The important conclusion for modern lawmen is that lawmaking is
prudence and therefore it is not science. Science is the knowledge we
have of the necessary and constant. It can be substantiated by
induction and deduction. Scientific conclusions are verifiable by checking with observable data. Prudence, on the other hand, is the judgment we make concerning the right use of means to an end in
contingent and variable human situations. Prudential conclusions are
corrected by conformity with right intention.3
Take the decision of the father on vacation with his family to
take a train instead of some other means of transportation, because
he judges it to be the safest mode of travel. A journal on one of the
cars is cracked, the train is wrecked, and his family is killed. Was
his decision a prudent one? Yes. He could not have had scientific
knowledge regarding every piece of equipment on the railroad. His
intention was to choose the means of transportation that, according
to the best information available to him, was the safest. From the
viewpoint of the fact situation, his decision was not a good one and
his good intention does not protect him from incurring the physical
consequences of his mistake. But from the standpoint of himself, his
decision, the only one possible in his situation, was both a good decision and a prudent judgment. In law, the judge's determination
regarding which facts in a case are to be admitted as material and
30. The reasoning of the court in the Niirnberg trials (irrespective of its
jurisdiction) has, more than any other recent event, thrown into clear relief
the issue of "is" and "ought" in law.
31. 1-2 ST 57, 4-6; 2-2 ST 47, 8.
32. 1-2 ST 17, 3, 1.
33. 1-2 ST 19, 3, 2; 1-2 ST 57, 5, 3; 1-2 ST 63, 2, 3; 1-2 ST 65, 2.
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which excluded as immaterial is many times a prime example of
prudence, not science, in action in daily lawmaking.
Source
The source of law for Aquinas is principally legislation, although
decisions by judges and customs established by the people also play
their part. For law is made mainly by the people or by their representatives who have been given public authority.34 Only such
persons are capable of directing actions which are related, immediately or mediately, to the common good.35 For this reason those
particularly charged with the care of the common welfare have the
special duty of steadily desiring the common good.36 Legislators
should be ready to change laws when it will benefit the common
good. Such changes, however, should not be made hastily but with
caution, since laws derive much of their efficacy from their habitual
observance by the people. Hence, the habits that the people have
formed of obeying a certain law should not be broken except for
37
reasons that clearly benefit the public welfare.
The people also make law by establishing customs. 38 They have the
basic authority to make law and their directive judgment regarding
something as necessary for the common good is law providing it is
clearly manifested. This manifestation is made through the repeated
actions of custom. For external actions make known the internal acts
of reason and will. The constantly repeated actions of the people
then, constitute the promulgation of custom-law. 39 If the custom is
established notwithstanding a statute to the contrary, the custom may
render the statute nugatory or require a particular construction of it.
In such a situation the toleration of the custom by the lawmaking
representatives of the people is tacit approval and implicit adoption
of the custom as law. 40 Hence, custom may make law, interpret it or
34. 1-2 ST 90, 3; 1-2 ST 91, 1; 1-2 ST 97, 3, 3.
35. 1-2 ST 96, 3.
36. 1-2 ST 19, 10; 1-2 ST 58, 5; 2-2 ST 47, 7.
37. 1-2 ST 97, 2.
38. 1-2 ST 97, 3, 2. There may be those who have difficulty in seeing custom

as a source of law, especially if they have adopted Austin's view that law is
a command of the sovereign to be enforced through power. If so, two facts
should be recalled. First, custom is a source of law inasmuch as it determines
the construction to be put upon certain parts of common and statute law.
Mercantile law is an example. See Adams v. Pittsburgh Ins. Co., 95 Pa. 348,
355, 40 Am. Rep. 662 (1880). Second, custom taken as a body of governing
regulations, such as it is especially among primitive peoples, has its own form
of punishment which in effect is legal sanction. Such are the sanctions of
ridicule, discrimination, ostracism and exile which can mean death, and the
like. This striking fact, born out by anthropological and ethnological data, has
caused a realization of the inadequacy of Austin's definition of law and the
necessity of its abandonment. See GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONGST
THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA xiii-xvii (1955).
39. 1-2 ST 97, 3.
40. 1-2 ST 97, 3, 3.
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abolish it.4l
Judges also, as mentioned, make law. Adjudication by someone
with public authority is necessary for the settlement of disputes
among litigants,4 2 when they are not able to compose their differences
among themselves. 43 The very title judge 44 implies the determination
of what is just 45 The judge is the interpreter of what is just; he is
"living justice." 46 One of his main qualifications, therefore, is that
he be capable of judging rightly.47 His prudential decision regarding
what is just, if it is not to be arbitrary, must be reached according
48
to written laws, for these embody both natural and positive rights.
Such a procedure is the application of written law to a particular
case and the judge's decision can be looked upon as a particular law
concerning some particular fact. 49 And because it is public authority
that is being exercised in both legislation and adjudication, the decision of the judge is to be obeyed and enforced in the same manner
as the enactments of legislators.5 0
The construction that a judge will give to a piece of legislation
should be guided by humane discretion, because the best of enactments can not possibly include all the imaginable cases that could
arise under it. Hence, where a literal construction of a statute would
work harsh injustice in individual cases, the judge's decision should
not follow the letter of the law. It should rather be according to
equity-the intention of the law.5 '
Legislation is superior to adjudication, according to Aquinas, for
three reasons which make interesting reading during these days of
large legislatures and judicial review. First, it is easier to find a few
wise men who are capable of framing right laws than it is to find
many men who would be required to judge rightly in individual cases.
Second, legislators deliberate at length on what is to be the content of
a law, whereas judges must make decisions regarding single facts in
situations that arise suddenly. It is easier for men to see what is
right from a consideration of the many facets of a problem than solely
from some one fact. Third, legislators judge universally and about
future events, whereas judges decide about the present regarding
which they are affected by love or hate or the desire to promote their
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

1-2 ST 97, 3.
1-2 ST 104, 1, 1.
2-2 ST 60, 1, 3.
Judex: jus dicens (literally, "declaring what is right").
2-2 ST 60, 1.
1-2 ST 95, 1, 2; 2-2 ST 67, 3.
2-2 ST 60, 1, 1.
2-2 ST 60, 5.
2-2 ST 67, 1.
2-2 ST 60, 6; 2-2 ST 67, 1.
2-2 ST 60, 5, 2; 2-2 ST 120, 1 & 2.
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own interests. Because the living justice which should be embodied.
in the judge is not to be found in many men and is flexible, legislation
should determine how matters are to be judged in as many instances
as can be and leave as few things as possible to the decision of
judges.52
Sanction
The consequences or sanction of obeying and disobeying a law are
the reward and punishment that ensue thereupon.5 3 Our actions are
good or bad according to whether or not they are ordered to a right
end.5 4 In law this is the common good. Men have the power of intelligent, voluntary free decision in their actions. 55 This decision can
be affected by ignorance, violence, fear, passion and the like. 56 Inasmuch as men have freedom of decision they have dominion over their
actions and are responsible for them. Hence, their actions are imputable to them as their authors. To impute the goodness or badness
57
of actions is to praise or blame.
Further, our actions affect society directly or indirectly, just as
"he who hurts the hand, hurts the man." 58 If the actions are good,
they benefit society. If they are evil, they injure society. And because of this relation between our actions and their effect on society,
justice demands a return by way of reward to those who benefit
society and by way of punishment to those that injure it. This is the
merit or demerit that is due for good or bad actions.59
In this manner and to this extent there is a "reintegration of the
equality of justice." 60 Those who observe the law are rewarded first
and foremost by the common good that the law is intended to procure. Those who obey speed laws, let us say, are rewarded with safe
driving conditions. Some laws also add specific rewards, such as
bounties. Violators of speed laws are punished by the deprivation of
safe driving conditions, the common good the law is alesigned to,
bring about. Further deprivations may be affixed by the law such as
fine or imprisonment.
A balance is thus re-established between the violator's defiance
of public authority and his eventual submission to it. He preferred
his own desires, in his act of violating the law, to those of public
authority. Now he is compelled to subject his desire to that of public
authority insofar as he must undergo punishment, of one kind or
52. 1-2 ST 95, 1, 2.

53. 1 ST 22, 2, 5.
54. 1-2 ST 21, 1.
55. 1 ST 19, 10; 1-2 ST 1, 1.

56. 1-2 ST 6.
57. 1-2 ST 21, 2.

58. 1-2 ST 21, 3.

59. 1-2 ST 21, 3; 1-2 ST 114, 1.
60. 1-2 ST 87, 6.
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:another, against his desire.61 Hence, punishment is the deprivation of
.a good, consequent upon the violation of a law, and against the will of
the violator.62 Such would be the deprivations, affixed by law, of
:property by fine, of liberty by imprisonment, of physical well-being
by flogging, and of life itself by capital punishment.
In a word, a man's punishment for a violation such as we have
-exemplified would be twofold: first, he is deprived of the safe driving conditions that the law was designed to bring about (an intrinsic
sanction) and, second, he is deprived of other goods as stipulated by
law (extrinsic sanctions).63 Punishment would not be necessary in
human living, according to Aquinas, if it were not for the historical
incident when the first man put himself beyond the law by disobeying
it.64

Obligation
Obligation, for Aquinas, is based on the necessity of a means for an
,end.6 If a man desire to cross the ocean and the only means of doing
so is by ship (air or water), then it is necessary that he use a ship. 66
lHe is free not to use a ship, but if he does not, he will not get across
the ocean. It is of the very nature of duty or what is due, therefore,
that there be an order of exigency or necessity of a means to the end
to which it is ordered. 67 In other words, obligation in Aquinas is
based on the supposition of a desired end and can be defined as the
moral necessity (not physical necessity) of choosing the means neces68
sary for a desired end.
At first glance this concept of obligation may appear to be purely
relative and hypothetical-I am obliged to choose to take a ship if
I wish to cross the ocean. As will be seen later regarding obligation,
such is not the case. Obligation is ultimately absolute and categorical.
The manner in which a means may be necessary for an end varies.
Some things are more necessary for good human living than others.6 0
Without speed restrictions on automobile driving, safe driving conditions on streets and highways would be impossible. Without various
61. Ibid.
62. 1-2 ST 87, 2 & 6.

63. The simplistic confusing of all punishment with revenge or the lex

talionis implies a failure to understand punishment in its relation to law's
purpose, law's infraction and law's enforcement. This failure is largely, the
result of that segment of psychiatric thinking which interprets men as irresponsible beings who are not to be blamed, and therefore not to be punished,
for what they do. See the Durham case, (Durham v. United States, 94 App.
D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 [1954]) discussed under "Crimes" below. See also
DAvrr, THE ELEmu rs OF LAW 195-216 (1959).
64. 1-2 ST 87, 7; 2-2 ST 163, 2.
65. 1-2 ST 99, 1.
66. 1 ST 82, 1.
67. 1 ST 21, 1, 3; 2-2 ST 58, 3, 2.

68. Ibid.

69. 2-2 ST 80.
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other traffic rules, say double parking regulations, although conditions
of safety would be more or less possible, they would not be so to the
same degree.
GOD-MADE LAW
Laws made by human lawmakers presuppose another kind of law,
that made by a divine lawmaker. The existence of the divine legislator can be known by reasoning from observable data.70 The evident
order that is observable in all things indicates that they are governed
by a governor, for order wherever found bespeaks an intelligent
orderer. 71 But what can be known by reasoning from evidence can
also be revealed and known through faith.72 Hence, since all men are
not capable of such reasoning, the existence of the divine lawmaker
has been explicitly revealed so that each and every man can know
with certainty the end to which his life must be related if he is
73
ultimately to attain happiness.
Nature
The supreme plan in the mind of the eternal lawmaker regarding
the government of the universe is a law,74 for it is a directive of all
things to their proper end or good.75 The eternal lawmaker is in a
position of authority; since all things are created by Him, all things
are subject to His authority and direction.7 6 And because whatever
the mind of God conceives is eternal and not temporal, this supreme
77
plan of direction for created things is fittingly called the eternal law.
Promulgation
The promulgation of the eternal law occurs in two ways: implicitly
in created natures and explicitly through revelation. Implicit in the
dynamic nature of men, as in all living beings, are drives both for
completion or perfection as well as for the means that will lead to
this end.7 8 Put another way, men have an urge to seek what is good
in general for them and for certain elementary goods in particular
that are necessary for them. These inclinations or tendencies constitute a directive principle of action intrinsic to the very nature of
a thing.7 9 They are a participation and reflection of the eternal law,8 0
70. 1 ST 2, 3.
71. 1 ST 103, 1. See PoLANm, THE LoGic oF
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 34'(1958).
72. 1 ST 1, 1. See GnsoN, THE CHRISTIAN
AQUINAS 13-14 (Shook transl. 1956).
73. 1 ST 1, 1.

74. 1-2 ST 91, 1.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

1-2 ST 93, 1; 1 ST 103, 1.
1 ST 103, 5.
1-2 ST 91, 1.
1-2 ST 91, 2.
1-2 ST 93, 5, 1.
1-2 ST 91, 2; 1-2 ST 93, 2.
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and as such are in fact its promulgation. 81 This promulgation of the
eternal law through the dynamic nature of created beings is designated by Aquinas as the naturallaw.8 2
Explicit promulgation of the eternal law is had in the revelation
of the Old and New Testaments.8
Such a special divine promulgation was necessary because men cannot know with absolute certainty
by their natural capacities either what their end actually is or what
they ought to do regarding all actions, even interior ones, in order
to reach it.84 This explicit promulgation of the eternal law, known
only through faith in the One revealing, is called by Aquinas divine
law.85
End
The common good which is the end of the eternal law has various
aspects some of which are known through natures and others only
through revelation. All beings manifest in their natures an inclination
to act in a manner perfective of themselves, as we have just seen.
The resultant order of the universe is a common good in which all
participate.8 6 This master drive is for what is good for men, that
is, for that object or good which will completely satisfy their desires
and thereby make them perfectly happy.8 7 Men's nature being the
same, this end must be common to them all. Hence, this ultimate end
of men is a common good.8 8 What it is specifically we shall see below.
Other drives of men indicate other ends that have the nature of a
common good, but which eventually are limited ends, ends related to
men's ultimate end. Men have a drive to preserve themselves and
their kind in existence. The resultant continued existence of the
human race is a common good.89 Men also have basic drives to live
together with other men in community and to do so rationally, that
is, by using their powers of intellect and will. The consequence of
this is a social condition in which at least an elemental sense of justice
and order prevail. This is a common good in which all share0
From their basic drives men have a clear and connatural knowledge
that what is good for them and will make them happy is an end for
which they should strive. 91 But any further knowledge about what
81. 1-2 ST 93, 5, 1.

82. 1-2 ST 91, 2. Whether natural law is right reason has been the subject
of some controversy. On this point see "'Law' as Knowledge of Law" infra;
see also 1-2 ST 74, 7.

83. 1-2 ST 91, 4.
84. Ibid.

85. 1-2 ST 91, 4, 1.
86. 1 ST 15, 2.
87. 1-2 ST 90, 2; 1-2 ST 94, 2; 1-2 ST 2, 8.

88. 1-2 ST 90, 2, 3.

89. 1-2 ST 91, 6, 3; 1-2 ST 94, 2.
90. 1-2 ST 57, 3; 1-2 ST 94, 2.

91. Connatural knowledge is "knowledge through inclination." 1 ST 1, 6, 3.
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their end actually is or what the means of reaching it are must come
through reasoning and revelation. Men can reason that eventually
their drive for happiness can be completely satisfied only by something extramundane. 92 They can further reason that the attainment
of the object or good that will bring this condition about must pertain
to their highest powers-intellect and will.93 But how this can actually
take place, men can know with certainty only through the explicit
divine promulgation of the eternal law.
It is through divine revelation that men learn with certainty what
the object is that will satisfy their desire for happiness and how its
possession is possible. For it is through revelation that men ascertain
that this object is God, who is the perfect good itself, and that the
possession of God is possible for men in a manner that completely
exceeds all human power.94 Final and perfect happiness is had by
men only when they meet God face to face and come to know Him
as He is in himself.95 Although the manner in which the perfect good
is possessed by the individual is the same as it would be if he were
the only human being in existence, 96 nevertheless, because factually
it is communicated to others, this supreme good has the aspect of a
common good. 97 This common good is the final end and purpose of all
the directives of the eternal law.98
Content
The content of the eternal law promulgated through nature is indicated by the demands of the basic inclinations. 99 These drives, to
It is the knowledge that we have which results from our judging, without
any reasoning process, that what is in agreement with our basic inclinations
or drives is good and that what is in disagreement with them is bad. 1-2 ST
58, 5; 1-2 ST 94, 2. Thus we connaturally judge, conscious of our basic drive
for self-preservation, that preserving our lives is a good and not an evil. On
this matter see Maritain, On Knowledge Through Connaturality, 4 REv. OF
METAPHYsIcs 473 (1951).
92. 1-2 ST 2, 8.
93. 1 ST 26, 2; 1-2 ST 3, 3, 5.
94. 1-2 ST 5, 5.
95. 1-2 ST 3, 8.
96. 1-2 ST 4, 8, 3.

97. 1 ST 60, 5, 5.
98. 1 ST 103, 2.
99. The locus classicus for the matter of this and the next paragraph is 1-2
ST 94, 2. Other citations will be added, however, where pertinent.
Anthropological and ethnological data abundantly attest to the existence
and functioning of these drives. See, e.g., GILiN, THE WAYS OF MEN 227-29
(1948); LINTON, THE STUDY OF MAN 133-50 (1936). Paleontological-biological
evidence also attests to the presence and working in men of these dynamic
inclinations and to their relation to evolutionary processes. "In man, considered as a zoological group, everything is extended simultaneously-sexual
attraction, with the laws of reproduction; the inclination to struggle for survival, with the competitions it involves; the need for nourishment, with the
accompanying taste for seizing and devouring; curiosity to see, with its delight
in investigation; the attraction of joining others to live in society. Each of

these fibres traverses each one of us, coming up from far below and stretching
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which we have just briefly alluded, are: first, the master drive for
what is good or perfective, that is, for that object which once permanently possessed will cause complete happiness; 100 and second, the
drives for the fundamental requisites for attaining this end. These
are: to preserve self in existence, to continue the race by sexual
propagation, 10 1 to live with other men in community and therein to
distinguish elementarily between justice and injustice, 102 and to use
the power of intellectual knowledge in discovering what is true
(especially regarding the origin and purpose of life) and the power
103
of free decision in choosing what is good and will lead to this end.
How does a man know of these demands of his basic drives? Are
they self-evident to him or does he have to reason to them? The
immediate objects of the inclinations are known without a reasoning
process. 104 They are known by connatural knowledge. Hence, happiness, self-preservation, sexual union, just communal living, knowledge
and self-direction are known as good and not as evil by all men who
are from the medical viewpoint normal human beings. How each of
these objects is to be sought in individual instances, it should be
noted, is a matter for reasoning, as is demanded by the drive for
knowledge and self-direction.
The immediate objects of the basic inclination or drives that are
known connaturally and with certainty may be said to pertain to
the natural law absolutely, while other mediate objects that are
known by means of a reasoning process and with the possibility of
error, pertain to it relatively.10 5 Hence, all men know at least that
much of the eternal law with certainty and with their natural powers
beyond and above us. And each one of them has its story (no less true than
any other) to tell of the whole course of evolution-evolution of love, evolution of war, evolution of research, evolution of the social sense." TEILHARD DE
CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN

100. 1-2 ST 5, 8.

179 (Wall transl. 1959).

101. 1-2 ST 91, 6, 3; 1-2 ST 100, 11, 3.
102. 1-2 ST 94, 5, 3; 2-2 ST 57, 2.

103. 1-2 ST 94, 4, 3. These drives are an essential part of men's nature.
They have to do with men's existence and with what is good and perfective
of men. They are steady and definite in every man. To be carefully distinguished from these essential drives are accidental tendencies to evil. These
vary with individuals and are not constant. The proclivity to steal or murder
is not definite in every individual man, as is the drive for self-preservation,
as even anthropological findings bear out.
The influence of Immanuel Kant has been greatly responsible for the
attitude, prevalent during the last three hundred .years, that the physical and
biological drives of a living being were not to be considered as indications of
what was good for that being. See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MoRALs 57-58 (Paton ed. 1947). But this attempt to "purify" philosophy
and law of everything empirical and to rule out iictual* means-ends relationships could not but result in the empty formalism that lawmen especially
have found so ineffective in dealing with day to day fact situations.
104. 1.2 ST 94, 2; 1-2 ST 100, 1.
105. 1-2 ST 100, 1; 1-2 ST 100, 11. See also 1-2 ST 91, 4.
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alone which is promulgated in the common principles of the natural
law.106
But at this juncture a distinction of vital importance for the
understanding of this matter must be made. Do all normal men
connaturally recognize the demands of their basic drives as being also
demands of the eternal law? Does an atheist or a primitive Ifugao,
who are normal men from the medical viewpoint, recognize in their
basic drives the natural promulgation of the eternal law of God? Obviously not. For in order to come to such an understanding they
would first have to reach the conviction that God exists and that He
is a creator-lawmaker. Their minds may change, of course, and they
may eventually come to this realization. Failing this, they can only
view the demands of their nature as normative directives which
oblige because they express an ordering or means necessary for an
end-what is good for them. The demands need not be viewed as
formal demands of law in order that their obligatory force be
107
recognized.
When it is said, then, that the connatural knowledge every man has
of the basic demands of his nature is actually a natural recognition
of the demands of the eternal law, it must be remembered that such
an insight implies the vantage point of a conviction already reached
that the eternal lawmaker exists and that in every created nature,
including that of the atheist and primitive, the promulgation of His
eternal law is recognizable. Only a man who is convinced that God
exists as creator and has philosophized however rudimentarily on this
fact, can see in the basic drives the natural promulgation of the
eternal law. The working of the eternal law in its dynamic promulgation in natures is always there, but it is not always identified as such
by all men.
The content of the eternal law as promulgated through divine revelation is clear and explicit. It includes the decalogue and the added
precepts. Thus, for example, to the commandment regarding the
keeping of the sabbath day are added the ceremonial precepts. And
to the commandment concerning theft are added the precepts concerning usury and fraud. 10 8 Knowledge of these directives is had
solely through faith. Faith, be it reoalled, is an assent of the mind
to a proposition, not because of evidence, but because of credibility of
the authority of the person presenting the proposition. 109
106. 1-2 ST 93, 2.
107. But unless the demands are ultimately seen as related to the- eternal
law, the rational (men) would have to be considered as receiving direction
from the irrational (natures). The rational is seen to be guided by the
rational only when the ordered drives of natures are recognized as an expression of the divine mind's plan of creation.
108. 1-2 ST 100, 11.
109. 2-2 ST 1, 4. See note 2 supra.
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Source
is, then, the divine lawmaker. It
law
eternal
the
of
The source
is God as governor of the universe." 0 As creator of natures with their
dynamic inclinations He is the source of the eternal law naturally
promulgated;"' and as revealer in the Old and New Testaments He
is the source of the eternal law divinely promulgated. 112
Sanction
The sanction for observing or violating the eternal law is the gain
or loss of its end. This reward or punishment, then, is intrinsic to the
means-end relation of the law rather than extrinsic and affixed as
further inducement to keep the law,"13 as may be the case in manmade law.
The sanction of the eternal law naturally promulgated is the gain
or loss in varying degrees of the goods of self-preservation, the propagation of the race, community living with a prevailing sense of
justice, and the acquisition of knowledge and the exercise of free
decisions."i 4 The reward for observing the eternal law divinely
promulgated is all these goods and beside as a final reward the vision
of God permanently possessed."i 5 The punishment for violating this
the ultimate loss
law is the loss of these goods in varying degrees and
6
of the possibility of union with God forever."
Obligation
The obligation of the eternal law rests on a means-end basis. As
promulgated through created natures, the eternal law expresses itself
in the basic drives of all beings" 7-whether recognized as such by the
individual or not as explained above. These inclinations, inasmuch
as they are for means and ends perfective of beings, bespeak the
necessity of these means for these ends." 8
Such a necessity need not be promulgated in a grammatical proposition only. Symbols, for instance, also convey such an ordering.
A large brilliantly illuminated arrow directing me to drive to the
right at the beginning of a divided highway is as much an expression
of a means necessary for an end as any grammatically expressed
proposition, even if I do not know it represents lawmaking authority.
It could conceivably have been put there by public minded neighbors
who had seen too many accidents occur in front of their homes in
110. 1 ST 103, 5; 1-2 ST 90, 1; 1-2 ST 93, 1.
111. 1 ST 103, 8; 1-2 ST 91, 2.
112. 1-2 ST 98, 2; 1-2 ST 106, 1.
113. 1-2 ST 21, 3-4; 1-2 ST 114, 1-3; 1-2 ST 87, 1-8.
114. 1-2 ST 94, 2.
115. 2-2 ST 175, 3, 4.
116. 1-2 ST 87, 3-4.
117. 1-2 ST 91, 2.

118. Ibid.
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the absence of proper action by a lax highway commission. But
the assumption is that the arrow is an expression of law and pleading
ignorance thereof would hardly constitute a defense if I am arrested
for disobeying the directive and driving down the wrong side of the
highway. So also do drives or inclinations express an ordering.
The necessity of means for an end, as we have seen, is the basis of
natural obligation, 119 which in turn is the ground for the obligation of
all man-made law.21 For it is in the first connatural judgment the
mind makes regarding action, namely that what is good for me is to
be sought, that the necessity of means to end is first recognized by
121
the human mind.
Obligation, as noted above, may appear at first sight to be relative
and hypothetical-I ought to choose to eat, if I desire to preserve my
life. But obligation is not relative and hypothetical if it is anchored in
an absolutely and categorically desired end. Obligation is, as we have
seen, the moral necessity of choosing means necessary for a desired
end. But the over-all end of my actions as determined by my master
drive is desired absolutely and categorically.
My master drive determines that I cannot but desire and seek what
is good for me. According to the way I am structured, whenever I
act it must be under the aspect of being for this end. The good is
that which is necessary for my self-development or happiness. Implicitly, then, I connaturally judge that I must do whatever is
necessary for this end. And because this end is desired with physical
necessity and with no choice on my part, 22 obligation which is based
thereon is absolute and categorical.
But how do I know what is good for me, and how do I know what
will lead to this end? My other basic drives indicate certain elementary actions that are good and necessary for my self-development.
One of these is my drive for self-preservation. Since I connaturally
judge that whatever I have a basic drive for is good and necessary
for me, I recognize without reasoning that I should preserve my life.
(Even when a man has brought himself to the point where he thinks
that self-destruction is "good" for him, it is a matter of observation
that the drive for self-preservation and a realization that it is a
necessary good for him persistently assert themselves up until his
act of self-destruction. This is why some degree of inward struggle
always accompanies suicide in a medically normal person.) Hence,
I am obliged absolutely and categorically to use the means necessary
for the preservation of my life.
119. 1 ST 82, 1; 2-2 ST 58, 3, 2.
120. 1-2 ST 93, 3.
121. 1-2 ST 94, 2.
122. 1 ST 19, 10; 1-2 ST 10, 1.
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Such likewise is the case regarding all the other possible actions of
my life, for they inevitably are either good and necessary for me or
they are not. In many instances I will have clear directives, whether
these come from the basic drives themselves or from man-made
statutes and decisions or from divine revelation. But in many situations I will have to rely on my own reasoning for an evaluation. I
am obliged to use some kind of ship, if I desire to cross the ocean,
to revert to the example mentioned above. But why should I desire
to cross the ocean? Depending principally on the reason why I am
making the journey, crossing the ocean could be for me an evil, a good
but not necessary, or a necessary good. If, whatever be the reason, I
judge that crossing the ocean is good and necessary for me, I am
obliged to desire it and to employ means necessary for its accomplishment for I am structured to seek what is good for me and I judge this
action to be necessarily related to this end. I am physically free to
refuse to do what I recognize is necessary for this end, but I am not
physically free to decide what this, my end, is.
The obligation of the eternal law divinely promulgated rests on
the same means-end basis. The end is clearly known.123 And the
means of obtaining this end are also precisely known in the revelation
of the Old and New Testaments. Because of this relation of what is
commanded to men's end, the commands and precepts of revelation
24
oblige.
In sum, then, regarding obligation we can say that all men who are
normal human beings judge connaturally the obligatory character of
the order of means to end expressed in their basic drives, whether
they relate this to the eternal law or not, as mentioned above. Some
men, who ponder on the nature of men and the world and come to a
conviction that an eternal lawmaker exists, may see the drives of
nature as the promulgation of the eternal law. Finally, all men who
believe in divine revelation can, without too much difficulty, attain
this comprehensive view of natures as related to the divine plan of
creation.
INTERRELATION

The relation of man-made law to God-made law promulgated in
natural drives is one of complement and therefore implicit dependence. From the promulgation of the eternal law in natural drives
men know of certain elementary and common principles of action,
as we have seen. These principles, while furnishing an elementary
guide for human activities, still must be applied to individual cases.
This is done either by deducing conclusions from these principles
123. 1-2 ST 3, 8.
124. 1-2 ST 99, 1; 1-2 ST 107, 2 & 3. See also 1-2 ST 21, 1.
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(from the principle that one man should not harm another, the conclusion can be drawn that one should not kill another) or by adapting
them to particular situations (from the principle that the evil-doer
should be punished, a more specific determination must be made regarding what kind of punishment should be administered in particular
instances) .125 Because of the great difference in the needs of various
peoples, the common principles cannot be applied to all men in the
same way. Hence, there will be a great diversity of man-made law
among various peoples. 12
In view of the role played by man-made law in the application of
the naturally known common principles of action, those principles
become the very fabric of statutes and decisions, whether recognized
as such or not. The concept of obligation itself in man-made law
derives from the necessity of means to end expressed in the basic
drives, as already noted. 127 All areas of man-made law have their
roots in the demands of the basic drives. Legal enactments regarding
health and safety, sex and domestic living, ownership and contract,
to mention but three areas of law, take their meaning and value from
the fact that the preservation of life, the use of sex, the distinguishing of "mine" from "thine" are naturally recognized as good and not
as evil. No legislator or judge has ever found it necessary to establish the rightness of these actions in general by legal decree. Men
connaturally judge, in law and otherwise, that these actions are not
28
evil in themselves but rather are good.
The relation of man-made law to the eternal law divinely promulgated is one of the relatively certain being clarified by the absolutely
certain. Besides the eternal law naturally known and its complement
in man-made law, a more clear and precise divine revelation of the
eternal law was necessary for four reasons: first, the actual end of
men cannot be known by natural powers and a higher directive is
needed; second, human judgment regarding contingent and particular
matters is uncertain and liable to error and absolute certainty is
necessary in these matters; third, human directives can only cover the
exterior actions of men and their interior actions as well must be
directed; and fourth, human law cannot pretend to punish all evils
for if it did so it would do away with many good things, and all evils
12 9
must eventually be punished.
The comprehensiveness of Aquinas' thinking on law becomes evident at this point. The primordiality of the eternal law naturally pro125. 1-2 ST 91, 3; 1-2 ST 95, 2.
126. 1-2 ST 95, 2, 3.

127. 1-2 ST 94, 2; 1-2 ST 99, 1.
128. 1-2 ST 94, 2.
129. 1-2 ST 91, 4.
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mulgated in relation to man-made law, the necessity of providing
man-made law to complement this naturally known eternal law, and
the final insufficiency of both of these which is remedied through
the divinely promulgated eternal law, all attest to the sweep of his
thought in this most vital matter.
OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

At this juncture certain remarks seem called for regarding Aquinas'
treatment of law. Some of these will be by way of general observations, others in the nature of specific comments.
A cursory glance at the references given above in our pr6cis of
Aquinas' position will readily show that they have not been drawn
exclusively from the relatively small section of his work entitled
"On Laws."' 30 This is the section that has been frequently reprinted
and which most American lawmen read when they desire to know
something of the thought of Aquinas on law. They do not realize that
anything like a comprehensive understanding of this man's position
on law can be achieved only by going far beyond this section to other
parts of his entire work. This is understandable since his thinking on
law is organically integrated, as it should be, with his thinking regarding the meaning of existence and of human nature.
The nature of the common good and of obligation, for example,
is nowhere developed in specific treatments by Aquinas. There were
good reasons for this. The common good was accepted in his time as
a "dictum authenticum," that is, a valid concept that needed no
verification. It was something like the notion "common welfare" is
today. But unlike the broad and vague notion of "common welfare,"
the idea of the common good has a concise and technical meaning
which could be and was stated by Aquinas. This was not done, however, in any one locus. Only by ranging over the entire works of
Aquinas, where the common good is found discussed obiter in relation to other subjects, can anything resembling a rounded idea of
the common good be obtained.
Similarly, there is no explicit treatment of obligation in the works
of Aquinas and understandably so. Law for him entailed the relation
of means necessary for an end. If an end was desired and a certain
means was necessary to attain it, one would be obliged to choose this
means in order to reach the end, as we saw. In such a view, obligation
is no problem and, once again, Aquinas touched on it obiter when
treating some related matter. Obligation becomes a problem only
when the objective relation of means to end grounded on a fact situation is blocked off from functioning as a basis of obligation, and
130. 1-2 ST 90-96.
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obligation is said to arise solely from the subjective will's "ought for
ought's sake.' 131 Hence, a knowledge of the meaning of obligation in
Aquinas can be acquired only by going beyond the section entitled
"On Laws."
More pointedly, however, certain comments need to be made. These
will be only briefly mentioned here rather than being extensively
developed, since the lengthy treatment which their complexity demands would be out of place in an article of this scope. These comments will have one thing in common: they will call attention to
differing ways in which Aquinas uses the word "law."
"Law" as Directive Judgment
First, Aquinas' main division of law is into eternal law, natural
law, human law, and divine law.132 But, as we have already mentioned above and will note again below, he explains both natural law
and divine law as promulgations of the eternal law. If this is the case,
"law" is being used in his principal division in two different senses:
one refers to human and eternal law, the other to the two ways in
which the eternal law is promulgated, namely, natural law and divine

law.
The use of the word "law" as a designation for both man-made
and God-made law is the division of "law" that we have employed in
this article. If law is an ordering or directive judgment of reason,
the main distinction of law should be between those directive judgments that are formed in the minds of men and those that are formed
in the mind of God; for the most fundamental division possible of
existing things is that between created beings and uncreated being,
which in this context implies the distinction between created minds
and uncreated mind. On this basis, the first and controlling division
of law is into man-made or human law and God-made or eternal
law. In each of these instances, the word "law" is used to designate
a proportional fact situation in which there is an actual similarity
between the directive judgment in the mind of men and the directive
judgment in the mind of God. There are, obviously, proportional
differences also such as the differing sources of lawmaking authority
133
and differing common goods.
"Law" as Promulgation
Second, if natural law and divine law are called "law," in what
sense is the word used? What Aquinas designates as "natural law" is,
according to his own explanation, the natural promulgation of the
131. See KANT, op. cit. supra note 103, at 68.

132. 1-2 ST 91.
133. On the analogy of law see DAVITT, THu ELEMENTS OF LAW 150-52 (1959).
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eternal law.134 What he titles "divine law," again on his own accounting, is but the revelatory promulgation of the eternal law. 135 But can
the promulgation of a law be termed "law"; and, if so, with what
meaning?
When Aquinas gives his definition of law, he seems to include promulgation as part of it. 136 Promulgation, however, as he explains in
this same article, is the "application" of a rule to individuals according to which they are to be guided. This application takes place
when the rule is made known to them. 37 Promulgation, then, as
explained by Aquinas and in spite of the fact that he seems to include
it in the definition of law, is not part of the essence of law. What
is applied must be already constituted what it is before it can be
applied, as already noted. For instance, a cane is a cane before it is
applied or used by an old man.138 Promulgation, therefore, is but
a prerequisite condition for a law to become an effective guide. 139
Accordingly, if the natural promulgation of the eternal law is called
"law" (natural law) and the revelatory promulgation of the eternal
law is called "law" (divine law), the word "law" in these instances
is not being used in a sense based on proportional facts as is the case
concerning man-made (human law) and God-made law (eternal
law). But because of the relation of promulgation to the directive
judgments of lawmakers, as the necessary condition for their efficacy,
promulgation does in a way partake of the effectiveness of law. For
this reason "law" is attributed to promulgation as when we call the
written statute "law." When "law" is used at all regarding promulgation, then it has to be understood as being attributed to it.
"Law" as Knowledge of Law
Third, besides saying that "natural law" refers to the inclination
through which the eternal is naturally promulgated, as we saw
above, Aquinas also says that "natural law" is the "light of natural
reason" by which we discern what is good and evil.140 This apparently inconsistent explanation of the nature of "natural law" presents
a problem. To call our reason (by which we know the naturally
promulgated eternal law) "law," is to extend the use of the word
"law" beyond the directive judgment of the lawmaker, and beyond
its promulgation, to the subject's knowledge of the law. But in what
sense can the word "law" be used to denote the subject's knowledge
134. 1-2 ST 91, 2; 1-2 ST 93, 2; 1-2 ST 93, 5, 1; 1-2 ST 94, 2; 1-2 ST 94, 3.
135. 1-2 ST 91, 4; 1-2 ST 91, 4, 1; 1-2 ST 98, 3, 3.
136. 1-2 ST 90, 4.
137. Ibid.
138. 1-2 ST 16, 1; 1-2 ST 17, 3.
139. 1-2 ST 90, 4. See also 2 LoTn=, PRINCIPES DE MORALE 97 (1947).
140. 1-2 ST 91, 2; 4 AQuINAs, COMMENTARY ox THE SENTENcEs OF PETER
LOMBARD 33, 1, 1 (1256).
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of the law?
When I learn what the traffic law is from its promulgation through
a roadside sign or symbol such as mentioned above, can the judgment I thereby make be termed "law"? It would seem not. My
knowledge of the law is not the law. Hence, if the connatural knowledge I have of the eternal law expressed in the ordering of my basic
drives is termed "law," it is in a sense that has no relation to the
manner in which "law" is used in ordinary legal parlance. At this
point, communication breaks down between those who use the
word in this sense and the legal mind.
Why, it should be asked, did Aquinas say in one place that natural
law is the light of reason and in another place that it is the basic
41
inclinations? This seeming discrepancy has long since been noted.'
Although these two meanings are interrelated, they are not the
same. "Reason" refers to knowing and "inclination" pertains to
seeking.'4
An answer may be that it was merely a matter of emphasis for
Aquinas. Men's inclinations are rational inclinations inasmuch as
man is rational and his reason is what specifies him uniquely as a
man. Reason is that part of man that is like his creator. The only
way that men can act is according to what they judge is good for
them and it is only through a judgment of reason (with or without
a syllogistic process) that men recognize an action as good or bad.
Without this judgment of reason, the relation of agreement or disagreement between the action and some norm would not be recognized. 143 In this sense reason, judging with good intention, is the
norm of the goodness or badness of human action and can be said
to "participate" in the divine reason's lawmaking.'4
But if this relation between an action and its norm is not to be
merely a subjective one originating solely within reason itself (as
Kant said it was), it must be grounded on an objective basis, one
which is outside reason and according to which reason judges. This
is recognized by Aquinas. For when he explains how reason can be
a rule for human actions, he says that its guide "is derived from the
created things that man knows naturally" as well as from divine
revelation. 145 And according to Aquinas himself, as we have seen,
141. See

LECLERCQ, LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE DE SAINT THOMAS

DEVANT

LA

PE]NSiE CONTEMPORAINE 391-392 (1955).

142. 1-2 ST 94, 2.
143. Moreover, the part that reason plays in men's lives needed stressing
in Aquinas' time. There were those who felt that men's minds were either
darkened by paganism or enlightened by revelation. The function of reason,
especially as a prerequisite to faith in revelation, needed emphasis and
Aquinas supplied this to no small degree.
144. 1-2 ST 90, 1, 1; 1-2 ST 91, 4, 1; 1-2 ST 93, 2.
145. 1-2 ST 74, 7.
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these "created things" are men's basic drives or inclinations.
Men do participate in the divine reason's law-ordering, dynamically
expressed in their nature, by connaturally recognizing it through
their own reason and by directing their actions accordingly. But they
do not participate in the divine reason's law-ordering in the sense
that their own reason is a co-planner, co-creator of nature and drives,
and co-lawmaker with the eternal reason. Man is not God.
"Law" as Reasoned Conclusions
Fourth, if the inclinations are not retained as the starting point
of reasoning regarding the goodness and badness of human action,
there will be a tendency to allow the "light" of reason to take their
place. All judgments concerning the goodness and badness of human
actions will be said to belong to the natural law inasmuch as these
judgments depend on their relation to "reason" which is the "proper
principle of human acts."' 46 Thus, Aquinas explains, reason starts
with naturally known principles and proceeds in various ways to
judge in diverse matters.
Some judgments are reached immediately and with very little
consideration, for instance, that parents should be honored and that
no one should kill or steal. Other judgments are reached only after
147
much consideration, for example, that the aged should be honored.
This is the basis for the traditional distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary precepts of the natural law.148 All of these
judgments, not only those connaturally known through the inclinations but also those that are reached by way of reasoned conclusions
from these primary judgments, "belong to the .aatural law."
But, as Aquinas recognizes, many of the judgments that need consideration may be in error. In fact, this is the precise reason why
revelation is necessary. 149 If this is the case, in what sense can
these reasoned conclusions be called "law"? They are not certain
knowledge of the law as are the connatural judgments and even
these cannot with accuracy be termed "law," as we have just seen.
Further, it is an immemorial axiom that a law about which there is
a doubt does not bind. The reason is that if there is doubt, the law
has not been clearly and certainly promulgated. And if a law is not
fully and undoubtedly promulgated to us, we cannot be expected to
be obliged by it. But when error is possible in knowing what a law
is, it has not been clearly promulgated.5 0 Hence, it would seem better
146. 1-2 ST 100, 1.
147. Ibid.

148. On the inutility of continuing this distinction see
120-125, 183-188 (1954).
149. 1-2 ST 91, 4; 1-2 ST 100, 11.
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150. This is not the same as "ignorantia non excusat." The ignorance of

the law which does not excuse presupposes that there exists a law that has
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not to designate as "law," not only the connatural judgments by
which we know the eternal law, but also the conclusions we reach
by reasoning from these principles.
Rather, these reasoned cbnclusions should be termed what they
actually are: attempts to determine what is good and bad regarding
human actions, say using nuclear bombs, in the absence of clear and
specific directives. These judgments should be in conformity with
divinely revealed eternal law and with the statutes and decisions
of human law. But in the absence ofs§uch specific directives or of a
knowledge of them, all that' men can do is reason, deductively and
inductively, from the connaturally known elementary demands of
their basic drives and conclude What seems best to them in particular
situations. These judgments are obligatory on individuals, not because they represent certain knowledge' of a law, but because they
are the only norm of goodness or badness the individual has according
to which he may guide himself. This norm h e must follow since for
him personally in many circumstances there is no other.
This is the situation whether the reasoning be done by private
persons or by those with public authority. The conclusions that
legislators and judges arrive at when reasoning from the basic
demands of men's natuie can be, upon occasion, no more certain and
free from error than those of the people who elected them. For
although the people can give their representatives the authority to
govern them politically, they cannot give them what they do not
have, namely, the insight always to reach reasoned conclusions that
are free from error. The authority which the people have to direct
their own actions, which is delegated in part to their representatives,
does not derive from a certain knowledge of the minutest possible
demands of their nature. Rather it comes from the necessity of determining, in the absence of other guides as we have just noted, what
is best in a given situation.
It can therefore be said that the conclusions reached by legislators
and judges take on the aspect of law because they are embodied in a
prudential judgment which is a legal directive of the people concerning means necessary for their common good. For this purpose the
people have delegated lawmaking authority and it is many times
by this type of judgment alone that lawmakers can guide the people.
Although as far as the lawmakers themselves are concerned their
judgments are rectified by conformity with right intention, as we
been properly promulgated and concerning which this particular individual
is ignorant. Although he may not be morally guilty of committing a crime,
nevertheless on account of evidential expediency he cannot be held to be
legally excused. On the other hand, the principle "lex dubia non obligat"
calls in question the very existence of the law. If the law existed, it can be
assumed to have been properly promulgated. Otherwise, it does not oblige.
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saw above, nevertheless in reference to the fact situation at hand
these judgments are quite often only relatively certain and may
quite possibly be in error.
It should be noted that Aquinas does not attempt to show how
judgments regarding killing, stealing, honoring parents and the aged,
and the like, are deducible from the certainly known principles which
he has already established as the point of departure for any reason51
It is
ing concerning the goodness or badness of human activities.
conjecturable that if he had made this attempt, which would have
meant keeping the demands of the drives in center focus, a more
careful statement would have resulted regarding the status of conclusions reached by the reasoning of individuals as natural "law."
Aquinas, however, did not have the opportunity to revise this
section of his work. He died a few short years after it was written.
As has been remarked, "It is unfortunate for the clarity of his views
toward natural law that Aquinas, who died at the age of forty-nine
(or forty-seven), did not'live longer so as to be able to elaborate the
152
full implications of his philosophy of the natural law."'
Another result of keeping the inclinations fixedly in view would
undoubtedly have been a more limited concept of natural law which,
taken in its strict sense, would be confined to those judgments that
are known connaturally from the basic drives. Such judgments are
common to all men who are normal according to medical standards
and therefore have universal validity. If, on the other hand, the
accent is put on "reason," this can be wrongly interpreted and
"natural law" can come to mean what is common among "reasonable"
(or even civilized) people. Such an interpretation could be the
explanation of why more candid and critical attempts have not been
made to ascertain what the universal judgments of the natural law
actually are.
It has been said that emphasis on "reason" has
for two thousand years tempted thinkers away from the search for universal elements. The trouble is that therewith our own interpretation
of what is reasonable decides the outcome of our research in advance.
We are naturally always inclined to consider our own ideas about justice
reasonable and those of others that conflict with ours, unreasonable.
Whenever reasonableness is the issue, we cannot decide it in an intersubjectively plausible manner by referring to our own reason .... Therefore it is most important to stick td the identification of those elements in
invariant in all people, and not
the sense of justice that are universal 15and
3
only in those whom we call reasonable.
151. 1-2 ST 94, 2.
152. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 100 (1960).
153. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEeRY 394-395 (1959). See also 386, 490, 492.
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"Blue-Print" Theory
Further, it is only when the word "law" is restricted to its proportionately factual use regarding man-made and God-made law
and to its attributive use concerning their promulgations, that the
"blue-print" notion of natural law fostered by Locke and others can
be avoided. 154 This is the idea that natural law is some sort of a formal
code of specific ideal precepts, deducible with mathematical certainty, which human law must match and reflect if it is to be just.
Such a "natural law" is actually moral philosophy turnea legal
discipline. Instead of recognizing man-made law as the complement
and development of relatively few certain moral principles, men
began to look on the conclisions deduced from these principles as
"original" law in conformity to which the provisions of man-made
law were a duplication or a "copy." The view was that somewhere
behind or above legal rights, which pertained to "law," there was an
explicit code of natural rights, which was a matter of "morality."
Such thinking could not but produce a sharp distinction between
law and morality.
It must be admitted that sometimes the interpretation put on
Aquinas' natural law can sound like that of Locke. Such is the case,
for instance, when it is said that natural law is "a code levied, on all
men" 155 or that "by examining his nature with the light of reason
man develops the natural law into a formal code of moral principles." 15 6 It may be true that Aquinas' use of the word "law" regarding reasoned conclusions has misled some into holding the "formal
code" interpretation. But his express recognition of the possibility
of error in these conclusions should be enough to alert the perceptive
reader to be wary of adopting tiny such position.
In Aquinas' mind natural law, far from being a mechanical archetype of man-made law, is rather its organic 41an vital. The implications of the natural demands of men's nature are "open" to a
continuous evolving through the human legal process. Aquinas' position is, therefore, "far from an abstract rationalism which seeks to
deduce by reason a solution f6r every specific concrete question. Thus
there is plenty of scope in his construction for a sociological-realistic
u5 7
form of legal politics.'
In sum, as far as this "comment" goes, Aquinas uses the word "law"
in reference to four different data: the directive judgment of lawmakers (human and eternal law), the promulgation of this judgment
154. See LOCKE, AN

ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
DE JUiRP BELLI AC PAcs,

n. 20 (Pringle-Pattison ed. 1934); GRoTius,
43, 1 (Whewell ed. 1853).

155. HIGGINS, MAN AS AUX 115 (1949).
156. FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND REASON 187 (2d ed. 1959).
157. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 245 (1959).

bk. 4, c. 3,

bk. 2, c. 20,
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(natural law and divine law), the knowledge acquired without
reasoning that we have of the eternal law naturally promulgated
("primary knowledge of the natural law"), and conclusions reached
by us through reasoning from these primary principles ("secondary
and tertiary knowledge of the natural law"). From our above examination, it is evident that the word "law" is used analogously and
validly in the first two instances; proportionately so regarding manmade and God-made law, attributively so concerning the promulgation of law. Its use in the other two instances is such that, as far as
the legal mind is concerned, no communication takes place.
APPLICATIONS

One of the most important applications of Aquinas' philosophy of
law relates to its main presupposition. This is his philosophy of
human nature according to which men are essentially composed not
only of matter but also of spirit with its two powers of intellect and
will. This unique nature sets men apart from all else in creation.
Each man is a distinct, separate entity with a dignity peculiar to him
158
and to him alone.
Individual and Society
When the question is raised, then, whether the individual man or
society is the more important and whether man-made law should
favor the one or the other, the basis for an exact answer is at hand.
Inasmuch as men need and must work for the temporal, political
common good of peace, security and the like, society is more important and individual men are subject to the laws that are designed
to bring these ends about. 5 9 But insofar as by their very nature men
have a destiny that transcends the temporal and the political, individuals are more important than society and should not be restrained
by man-made law from pursuing those activities that pertain directly
to this higher and ultimate end.16
This interpretation of the nature of men is the lode star that guides
all thinking regarding life and law. Aquinas himself did not draw
the implications of his philosophy of law regarding the various areas
of law as we know them today, for this was not his purpose. But
because it is fairly obvious what some of these applications would
be at least in broad outline regarding certain controlling points in
law, they will be briefly indicated.
Constitutional Law
Constitutional law, besides establishing the type of government
158. 1 ST'75-83; 1-2 ST 2, 8; 1-2 ST 3, 3.
159. 1-2 ST 21, 3, 2; 1-2 ST 90, 2; 1-2 ST 96, 4.
160. 1-2 ST 2, 8; 1-2 ST 3, 4; 1-2 ST 21, 4, 3.
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we have and fixing the limits of its authority, is also concerned with
the protection of the rights of individual citizens. The method by
which this is accomplished is principally "due process." In its procedural aspect, due process presupposes the substantive claims of
individuals. In its substantive aspect; it attempts to strike a balance
between private claims and public needs. But what are the grounds
on which rest the validity of the so-called "inalienable" rights of
individuals?
According to the thought of Aquinas, the grounds for the "inalienable" rights of men can be found in the basic drives of their
nature which demand certain elementary things as necessary for
men's self-development and eventual perfection. In other words,
the "inalienable" rights of men do not derive from a contract made
by men when they supposedly transferred from a hypothetical "state
of nature" to a state of political govdrnment. 161 They derive, rather;
from the demands of men's political nature as it is now and always
was. The demands of men's 'natuire (and in this sense "natural law")
naturally coexist with man-made law. They are not in unnatural
competition with it. They are in fact its leitmotiv.
NoF do the "inalienable" rights derive from some sort of basic
162
norm arrived at by international agreements which must be kept.
For the question can be immediately raised: why should agreements
be kept? The answer must be either that they should be kept simply
because they should be kept, which is no answer at .all; or it must
be that keeping agreements is necessary for the common good of
men as demanded by their yery nature. 163 It is only when an interpretation of human nature such as that of Aquinas is rejected, that
men are driven to such strained and far-fetched notions concerning
the origin of men's natural rights.
Criminal Law
In criminal law the thrust of Aquinas' philosophy of man and law
can be seen most clearly. This is especially true in the light of certain contemporary trends such as those represented in the Durham
decision. 164 The thinking of the court in this case works dead against
the grain of Aquinas' entire thought. The underlying assumption of
this decision is that, for all practical purposes, only the mentally
defective or diseased commit crimes. 165 This assumption rests on the
further one that the "modern science of psychology" has ruled out as
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. I, C. 13 (Molesworth ed. 1839); LOCKE,
ON GOVERNMENT, 2d Treatise, c. 2, 6 (Cook ed. 1947); RouSSEAu,
SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, c. 6 (Watkins transl. 1953).
162. See KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 369 (1945).

161. See
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163. See ContractLaw below.
164. Durham v. United States, 94 App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
165. 214 F.2d at 875, 876.
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pass6 the interpretation of men as beings who, although perfectly
sane, can be led by the condition of their will and desires to choose
knowingly and freely to go against what their reason judges to be
the right thing to do.

66

As we have already seen above in discussing the sanction of manmade law, Aquinas holds that men are responsible beings because
they have the power of knowing and freely deciding. Actions that
are knowingly and freely decided are caused by their doers, they
belong to them, and are therefore imputable to them as good or bad.
Sanity, like knowledge, is a prerequisite condition for a crime, A lack
of it, insanity, is not a cause of crime but may rather be the reason
why the accused is not guilty of committing a formal crime at all.
Factors such as ignorance, violence, fear, anger, passion, compulsions,
mental defect and the like may affect both knowledge and the freedom of decision. Insofar as they do, responsibility and imputability
are lessened or completely nullified. Absolute freedom is not required
and relative freedom can be sufficient.
But this does not mean that every time a crime is committed one
of these factors must have been at work. When this is the case it has
to be proved, not presumed. For instance, an accused may be mentally defective but this condition will have to be established on medical evidence. What the commission of every crime does signify,
however, is that the condition of the accused's will was such that
he chose to put himself above the law and egotistically preferred his
desires to those of society as expressed in the law. Such would be
the case if the judge himself who wrote the Durham decision chose
to violate a speed law, which would be at least a misdemeanor if not
a felony under some circumstances.
The presence of mental disease is an abnormal condition. The
presence of a lawbreaking disposition in our will is not a disease nor
is it abnormal. It is as normal as is a law-abiding state of will, though
obviously of an entirely different value. To give the word "normal"
a statistical meaning in this context and to label the nonconformist
a "sociopath," is to betray a superficiality unworthy of reputable
psychiatry.
Tort Law
In torts also the force of Aquinas' thought can be seen in relation
to a contemporary tendency and again this is in reference to the root
problem of responsibility. This is logically consistent since "the
general principles of criminal and civil liability are the same ...."167
Absolute or strict liability, where the ability to pay is often a relevant
166. 214 F.2d at 871.

167. HOLmES, THE COMMON LAW 44 (1881).
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factor in determining liability, plows head-on against the current
of Aquinas' thinking. This theory assumes that in cases where there
is no intended harm or negligence, liability cannot be related to any
blameworthy act on the part of the tortfeasor. He has committed no
fault, such as occurs when there is intended harm or negligence. In
undertakings such as keeping dangerous animals, using high explosives or poisonous sprays, or bringing upon land dangerous
quantities of substances not naturally there, liability is said to be
"without fault" and must be related, not to the defendant's "fault"
which does not exist, but to some extrinsic factor such as his ability
to pay.
Again, as we have seen above, for Aquinas, responsibility originates
in the doer's decision to perform the action. He is thus the cause
of the act and of what follows as a result of the act. On this basis
rests his responsibility and liability. There is an intrinsic relation
between liability and the decision to act. Hence, the consistent explanation from this point of view is that, although there may be no
fault in strict liability cases (if there were it would be morally wrong
to engage in such enterprises), nevertheless there is assumed responsibility in them. On the decision to engage in these activities and
thereby assume responsibility for them is grounded the tortfeasor's
liability. This, it is now conceded, is the principle of law expressed
in Rylands v. Fletcher and not ability to pay, which appears to have
been born of a misinterpretation of this famous case. 168
The importance of locating the grounds of responsibility in torts is
the same as it is in crimes. Either it must be held that the basis of
responsibility is ultimately some factor within the actor or that
it is something outside him. Either it will be his knowing and free
decision to do the act as explained above or it will be something
like "ability to pay" in torts and "society's failure" in crimes. These
alternatives represent two different philosophies of responsibility
and law.
Property Law
In property law there is an assumption made in one half of the
legal world that is totally rejected in the other half-that men have
a natural right to private ownership especially of the means of production such as land, ore, coal, oil, gas, uranium and the like.
Aquinas' position in this matter is cognate with the legal thinking
prevalent in what is now termed "the free world."
First, in general it is natural for man to have dominion over things
external to himself. This is why things were made. The imperfect
168. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
TiiE LAW OF TORTS 179-80 (1953).
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is for the sake of the perfect 169 and through his reason and will man
can put them to his own use. 17 0 This he must do if he is to sustain
his own life.17 ' There is, then, a common aspect to things according
to which all things are made for all men.
Second, in particular it is natural for men to own things as their
,own for several reasons. Men work more solicitously when expending their efforts on something that is their own. This causes affairs
to be conducted in a more orderly fashion. As a consequence, each
man being content with his own, a more peaceful condition is ensured. For it is when things are not possessed by men as their own
17 2
that quarrels arise more frequently.
It could be objected that according to nature all things are common
to all men and that to possess things as one's own is contrary to this
common ownership of goods. Aquinas explains that the natural law
,does not "dictate" that all things should be possessed in common
and that nothing should be possessed as one's own. Rather, men recognize the practical necessity of possessing external things as their
own for the reasons just mentioned and establish the institution of
private ownership. 7 3
Third, an important qualification is added by Aquinas. Although
men may possess things as their own, they must never lose sight of
the common aspect of things as noted first above, that is, that all
things are created for all men. Hence, men must be prepared to
share what they have with others in their need. 7 4 The Marshall Plan
of giving economic aid to needy countries (apart from the political
motives that to some degree inspired it and the manner in which it
has at times been administered) could perhaps be pointed to as an
example of this principle in action on the national level.
Contract Law
Contracts, or more specifically the part played by one type of
consideration in contracts, is one final area of law in which the implications of Aquinas' thinking may be indicated here, although there
are many more such areas which cannot be treated within the confines of this article. Contracts are promissory agreements. Contracts
are said to oblige in Anglo-American law because of consideration.
Consideration, in its most important form, is the price bargained
and paid for a promise. Such bargain and exchange consideration
is evidence of intention to enter upon a legal contract and as such is
169. 2-2 ST 64, 1.
170. 2-2 ST 66, 1.
171. 2-2 ST 66, 1, 1.
172. 2-2 ST 66, 2.
173. 2-2 ST 66, 2, 1. See also 2-2 ST 57, 4, 2. For a further developed
rationale of property, see DAVITT, ELEMNTS or LAW 259-69 (1959).
174. 2-2 ST 66, 2.
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designed to prevent fraud.
As is well known among lawmen, consideration is an Anglo-American contractual phenomenon. It is not part of the contract of nonEnglish speaking countries. In these countries the doctrine of "cause,"
as evidence of intent to contract legally, is prevalent. The cause of
a contract is taken to be the immediate end which the contractor has
in view: the intent to exchange jural relations of title, claim and
duty regarding some particular object. This intention obviously
carries the implication of benefit to another party and, as such, is
not too much different from consideration as has often been pointed
out.175

For Aquinas a promise is the means by which one man binds
himself to another. It entails an act of reason by which one man
directs what he himself is to do for another. 176 This mental act is
exmanifested by words, oral or written. Words are the natural,
17
noted.
already
have
we
as
acts
mental
ternal signs of interior
The keeping of the promise that one man makes to another is a
form of natural honesty and truthfulness.' 7 8 If a man changes his
mind and thereby redirects his actions towards the promisee otherwise than he had manifested by his words, he is guilty of a form of
deception and lying. For it is unnatural for a man to signify by his
179
Men are
words something other than what he has in his mind.
social animals who owe one another whatever is necessary for the
preservation of human society, and it would be impossible for men
to live humanely in society unless they trusted each other as speaking the truth one to the other. 180 The keeping of promises is demanded, then, by the nature of men's power of speech and its relation
to social needs. It is because the keeping of contractual promises is
a means necessary for the common good, then, that contracts oblige.
In other words, if contractual obligation is said to derive from
consideration, something outside the nature of the contractual promise
itself is made the basis of the obligation. If, on the other hand,
contractual obligation is seen to arise from the very nature of a
promise itself, the ground of this duty is intrinsic to the nature of
the contractual promise and its relation to the common good. True,
evidence of the intention to contract and bind legally is necessary.
Consideration can be evidence of this intent-as can cause, a writing
or a seal. But taken in this evidentiary capacity, consideration is not
175. See

SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE

374

(8th ed. 1930).

176. 2-2 ST 88, 1; 2-2 ST 88, 4; 4 AQUINAS,
OF PETER LOMBARD 38, 1, 1, 1 (1256).
177. 2-2 ST 110, 3.
178. 2-2 ST 88, 3, 1.
179. 2-2 ST 110, 3, 5.
180. 2-2 ST 109, 3, 1.
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the reason why contracts oblige. It is merely evidence of the intention to bind legally.
CONCLUSION

The work of Aquinas can furnish us with the firm guide lines in
our thinking regarding law. As noted above, it is undoubtedly a
masterful accomplishment. Nonetheless, being a pioneer endeavor
it has, to use an expression of the French, the defects of its qualities.
Its main outlines are solid and will stand foursquare as the test of the
centuries has proved. On the other hand, clarifications of terminology
are needed; adjustments are called for; details must be filled in. But
the main inspiration and direction of Aquinas' thought are as right
and valid today as they were the day he first put pen to paper and
began to write "On Laws."
Undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of his contribution
is natural law and its relation to eternal law. The vitality of natural
law is shown by its history which is a series of eclipses and revivals
from the Greeks to the present time.181 And it is important to note
in this regard that "the natural law which today dominates the
greater part of legal philosophy is not a revival of the eighteenth
century rationalist systems, but a thread of scholasticism that has been
picked up again."'182
But it must be remembered, in assessing the practical value of
Aquinas, that his thought is an integral whole. It is a synthesis
organically related to his philosophy of being and of man. This fact
has sometimes been overlooked as when it is said, for instance, that
"If we disregard the metaphysical and the dogmatic [in Aquinas],
there are favorable opportunities for an understanding between this
trend [Thomism] and a realistic study of law."'183 This is much like
saying that if we only prescind from the economics and the dialectical materialism in Marxism there are great possibilities for
accepting this ideology as a way of life.
No, the thinking of Aquinas, like that of any consistent man, must
be taken in its entirety if it is to be comprehended at all. More
discerning are the remarks that "what has really been revived is a
strong sense of the need which gave rise to the doctrine of natural
law in the past: the need for a standard of justice by which to
evaluate the positive law, a standard firm and yet not subject to
the criticism which destroyed the older natural-law doctrines" and
that this is "a broad philosophical problem" to which only a tradi181. See BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY 138-142 (1959).
182. Ross, ON LAw AND JUSTICE 255 (1959).

183. Id. at 245.
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tion such as that of Aquinas "has a coherent metaphysical answer."'
It is only when Aquinas is approached on this radical level that an
insight is possible into the profound implications of his thought on
law.

184.

(1958).
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